Welcome to the January 29, 2009 Objectivist Roundup!
Objectivism is the philosophy created by Ayn Rand (1905-1982). She described it as a "philosophy for living on earth." For the five branches of that philosophy, the foundational ideas are: objective reality (metaphysics); reason (epistemology); self-interest (ethics); capitalism (politics); and romantic-realism in art (esthetics).
For the events of Ayn Rand's life, read Jeff Britting, Ayn Rand, 2004. For her philosophical thoughts, with leads to individual writings, peruse The Ayn Rand Lexicon, editor Harry Binswanger. Unique among primary philosophers, Ayn Rand not only wrote technical philosophical works (such as Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology), but she was also a best-selling fiction writer showing her philosophy in action--for example, in her novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. (The Ayn Rand Bookstore carries all of her works.)
This Objectivist Roundup includes the following articles written by supporters of Objectivism:
Kendall Justiniano presents What Really Caused China's Success? posted at The Crucible & Column, saying, "The short answer: property rights (where they were granted and protected). Detailed analysis of factors in China's rise."
Khartoum presents Some Of My Insights -- Concept-Formation. posted at Philosophy, Law and Life, saying, "Here are some of my notes from Greg Perkin's Objectivism Seminar."
Ari Armstrong presents Barack Obama and the Politics of Cynicism posted at FreeColorado.com, saying, "In his inauguration address, Barack Obama claimed that the advocates of free markets are cynics. He instead wants the federal government to monitor and control markets with its Watchful Eye. But his is the truly cynical position."
Roberto Sarrionandia presents Libertarians vs Property posted at Tito's Blog, saying, "How the libertarian movement would dispose of your right to property, and thus disregard your right to life."
Ryan Puzycki presents By Government Fiat Alone posted at The Undercurrent, saying, "Fiat wants US taxpayers to guarantee its investment in Chrysler - an investment it deems too risky to make with its own money. Only a government that has abandoned the protection of property rights would sacrifice productive individuals' wealth to the black hole of the auto lobby in Detroit."
K. M. presents Political systems and success posted at Applying philosophy to life, saying, "A post that attempts to answer the question "Is it possible for an ideology that is inferior from a moral standpoint to actually succeed in history?""
Stephen Bourque presents Notes On Barack Obama's Inaugural Address posted at One Reality, saying, "In the same sentence, President Obama manages to placate the right by mentioning God, the left by hinting that everyone will get an equal piece of a collective pie, and even the freedom lovers (where we may still be found), by referring to the Declaration's "pursuit of happiness.""
Rational Jenn presents Positive Discipline And The Trader Principle posted at Rational Jenn, saying, "I talk about how Positive Discipline helps me reinforce The Trader Principle with my children."
Daniel presents Amélie and Philosophy, 5 posted at The Nearby Pen, saying, "This is the second to last post in my series on the movie Amelie. Here I show why the theme of the movie is "the need to face reality (or one's fears) in order to attain happiness" and most definitely not that "one achieves happiness by doing good things for others"."
Diana Hsieh presents Activism: Time to Up Your Game? posted at NoodleFood, saying, "It's not hard to become an effective activist for Objectivist ideas -- if you follow Paul's good example."
C. August presents Inside the Belly of the Beast: Do Policymakers Listen to Pundits? posted at Titanic Deck Chairs, saying, "Of policy wonks, pundits, and a possible pathway to Objectivism's penetration in Washington."
Tom Stelene presents How Religion Insults Us and We Don't Even Know It posted at The Imaginary Philosophy, saying, "People are often confronted by religionists saying, "you should live like/think like/be like/do like so-and-so in the Bible." Why are people not immensely insulted by such exhortations?"
To submit a weblog article to the next Objectivist Roundup use our submission form. For past posts and future hosts, see: blog carnival index page.
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Jan 29, 2009
Dec 26, 2008
What is bias?
Example 1: "Judge Sandra Olson recused herself from presiding at the trial of her niece, Ms. Bernice Smith, who had been charged with embezzling from the Tri-County Children's Fund. Judge Olson said she wanted to avoid even an appearance of bias."
What does "bias" mean here? Does the term name a valid concept? If the concept is invalid, should I keep the term, but use it to label a valid concept of my own creation, or should I abandon the term?
DICTIONARY USAGE. Like most general-purpose dictionaries, mine--The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., Unabridged--does not formally define concepts. Instead it records various conventional usages of terms. The usage of "bias" relevant to individuals is: having a "particular tendency or inclination . . . that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question."
I see two points worth spotlighting. The first is the idea of "tendency" ("inclination"). Where does a "tendency" arise? It arises in the subconscious, an area not directly visible to me, the area where I may make decisions but without awareness of the process and the factors that cause me to reach a particular conclusion. (I can, of course, consciously test and evaluate any decision that emerges from my subconscious; and I can consciously identify my "tendencies" and correct for them.)
The second point is the negative phrasing "prevents unprejudiced consideration." What that wording is not saying is "bias undermines objectivity" (which is a logical relationship between facts of reality and ideas). Our cognitive goal should be objectivity, not merely avoiding prejudice.
Returning to the conventional usage of the term "bias," another question arises. Why would an individual have a subconscious "tendency" to reach nonobjective conclusions? The following example illustrates a typical situation in which the term "bias" would be used.
Example 2: "In civilian life, Mr. Blair ran the Institute for Defense Analyses, a nonprofit group . . . that does extensive work for the Pentagon. But he had to step down from the post in 2006 amid concerns that his positions on the boards of several defense contractors constituted a conflict of interest."[1]
In this situation, Mr. Blair has an "interest" (extra income) that might lead him to favor a particular recommendation to the Pentagon because it would benefit him personally, not because the recommendation is the best for defending the country. For instance, Mr. Blair might, despite contrary evidence, recommend that the Pentagon purchase a certain new combat aircraft, one manufactured by a company of which he is a paid director.
Those who watch government are right to raise an alarm when consultants to the government are in a position to benefit indirectly from the advice they give. However, an alarm is not a proof. A particular individual, if he values objectivity, can have an apparent "conflict of interest" and yet render objective judgments. Not any particular short-term benefit, but the principle of objectivity as well as the virtues of rationality and honesty, can and should guide him. Only cynics--those who believe virtue is impossible--would automatically assume everyone in a supposed conflict of interest automatically chooses the particular interest over the principle.
Of course, a fully objective person--one who values reason and therefore objectivity--has no actual long-term "conflict of interests." He examines facts, draws conclusions logically from those facts, and then evaluates them objectively, in the full context of his philosophical as well as personal values. (Honest individuals can be confused, on the short-term, in selecting between particular values, but not between principles vs. particular values.)[2]
CONCLUSION. In its main elements and charitably interpreted, the conventional meaning of bias is valid but poorly formulated. A proper definition is: a mental condition in which a value held in the subconscious might lead a person who does not supremely value objectivity to make a judgment not supported logically by facts of the case being judged.
APPLICATIONS. In a debate, if I hear the word "bias" used as an accusation, I take it to mean that the accuser thinks the accused person has a particular interest (value) that might be more important to him than objectivity. (Ironically a charge of bias, if unexplained and unsupported, can prejudice an uncritical audience. It is a smear against the accused person.) If such an accusation is being made as an attack on the person, then I would ask for a definition and proof.
On the other hand, if the debater is bringing up bias as a caution--as in examining the medical results of clinical studies whose conclusions favor the pharmaceutical manufacturers who financed the studies--then I would accept the caution but make a point of not leaving it hanging in the air. I would ask for evidence that the conclusions were or were not objective.
I will generally avoid the term "bias." I will try to be more specific by using "illogical," "prejudice," "rationalization," or a similar concept that directly identifies the problem, if there is one. I will also stress the positive, objectivity, as the standard.
Burgess Laughlin
Author of The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
[1] Mark Mazzetti, "Likely Pick for Intelligence Chief Would Face Task of Corralling Fractious Agencies," New York Times, Dec. 20, '08, online. [2] For examples of (subconscious) prejudice influencing decisions in science: David Harriman, "Electric Current" subsection of "Errors in Inductive Reasoning," The Objective Standard, Winter 2008-09.
What does "bias" mean here? Does the term name a valid concept? If the concept is invalid, should I keep the term, but use it to label a valid concept of my own creation, or should I abandon the term?
DICTIONARY USAGE. Like most general-purpose dictionaries, mine--The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., Unabridged--does not formally define concepts. Instead it records various conventional usages of terms. The usage of "bias" relevant to individuals is: having a "particular tendency or inclination . . . that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question."
I see two points worth spotlighting. The first is the idea of "tendency" ("inclination"). Where does a "tendency" arise? It arises in the subconscious, an area not directly visible to me, the area where I may make decisions but without awareness of the process and the factors that cause me to reach a particular conclusion. (I can, of course, consciously test and evaluate any decision that emerges from my subconscious; and I can consciously identify my "tendencies" and correct for them.)
The second point is the negative phrasing "prevents unprejudiced consideration." What that wording is not saying is "bias undermines objectivity" (which is a logical relationship between facts of reality and ideas). Our cognitive goal should be objectivity, not merely avoiding prejudice.
Returning to the conventional usage of the term "bias," another question arises. Why would an individual have a subconscious "tendency" to reach nonobjective conclusions? The following example illustrates a typical situation in which the term "bias" would be used.
Example 2: "In civilian life, Mr. Blair ran the Institute for Defense Analyses, a nonprofit group . . . that does extensive work for the Pentagon. But he had to step down from the post in 2006 amid concerns that his positions on the boards of several defense contractors constituted a conflict of interest."[1]
In this situation, Mr. Blair has an "interest" (extra income) that might lead him to favor a particular recommendation to the Pentagon because it would benefit him personally, not because the recommendation is the best for defending the country. For instance, Mr. Blair might, despite contrary evidence, recommend that the Pentagon purchase a certain new combat aircraft, one manufactured by a company of which he is a paid director.
Those who watch government are right to raise an alarm when consultants to the government are in a position to benefit indirectly from the advice they give. However, an alarm is not a proof. A particular individual, if he values objectivity, can have an apparent "conflict of interest" and yet render objective judgments. Not any particular short-term benefit, but the principle of objectivity as well as the virtues of rationality and honesty, can and should guide him. Only cynics--those who believe virtue is impossible--would automatically assume everyone in a supposed conflict of interest automatically chooses the particular interest over the principle.
Of course, a fully objective person--one who values reason and therefore objectivity--has no actual long-term "conflict of interests." He examines facts, draws conclusions logically from those facts, and then evaluates them objectively, in the full context of his philosophical as well as personal values. (Honest individuals can be confused, on the short-term, in selecting between particular values, but not between principles vs. particular values.)[2]
CONCLUSION. In its main elements and charitably interpreted, the conventional meaning of bias is valid but poorly formulated. A proper definition is: a mental condition in which a value held in the subconscious might lead a person who does not supremely value objectivity to make a judgment not supported logically by facts of the case being judged.
APPLICATIONS. In a debate, if I hear the word "bias" used as an accusation, I take it to mean that the accuser thinks the accused person has a particular interest (value) that might be more important to him than objectivity. (Ironically a charge of bias, if unexplained and unsupported, can prejudice an uncritical audience. It is a smear against the accused person.) If such an accusation is being made as an attack on the person, then I would ask for a definition and proof.
On the other hand, if the debater is bringing up bias as a caution--as in examining the medical results of clinical studies whose conclusions favor the pharmaceutical manufacturers who financed the studies--then I would accept the caution but make a point of not leaving it hanging in the air. I would ask for evidence that the conclusions were or were not objective.
I will generally avoid the term "bias." I will try to be more specific by using "illogical," "prejudice," "rationalization," or a similar concept that directly identifies the problem, if there is one. I will also stress the positive, objectivity, as the standard.
Burgess Laughlin
Author of The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
[1] Mark Mazzetti, "Likely Pick for Intelligence Chief Would Face Task of Corralling Fractious Agencies," New York Times, Dec. 20, '08, online. [2] For examples of (subconscious) prejudice influencing decisions in science: David Harriman, "Electric Current" subsection of "Errors in Inductive Reasoning," The Objective Standard, Winter 2008-09.
Nov 30, 2008
Rationalization--What is it?
INITIAL DEFINITION. As an accusation, the term "rationalization" appears in casual conversations, weblog posts, and formal essays. Examples I have heard are: "Her explanation sounds like a rationalization to me." "Is what he said really true, or is it just a rationalization?" "His whole theory is a rationalization!"
A mundane but classic example of rationalization, is: "'I bought the matzo bread from Kroger's Supermarket because it is the cheapest brand and I wanted to save money', says Alex (who knows he bought the bread from Kroger's . . . because his girlfriend works there [and he wanted to see her but without admitting his interest])."[1]
As an initial definition then rationalization refers to someone justifying what he is doing with an explanation that he knows--at some level in his mind--is not the true reason for his action, but one he made up to make his behavior appear to be more acceptable.
STANDARD USAGES OF THE TERM. Wherever possible, I prefer using terms/ideas as they are conventionally used--to make communication easier. My home dictionary offers this primary conventional usage of "rationalize": "1. to ascribe (one's acts, opinions, etc.) to causes that superficially seem reasonable and valid but . . . actually are unrelated to the true, possibly unconscious and often less creditable or agreeable causes."[2] This usage captures the fact (1) that a rationalization is a statement; (2) that the statement is false; and (3) that the statement is designed to make the speaker's behavior appear to be acceptable.
An online dictionary of psychology defines "rationalization" thus: "A defense mechanism where one believes or states an acceptable explanation for a behavior as opposed to the real explanation." And defense mechanisms are: "Psychological forces which prevent undesirable or inappropriate impulses from entering consciousness (e.g., forgetting responsibilities that we really didn't want to do, projecting anger onto a spouse as opposed to your boss)."[3]
An online philosophical dictionary describes the fallacy of rationalization thus: "We rationalize when we inauthentically offer reasons to support our claim. We are rationalizing when we give someone a reason to justify our action even though we know this reason is not really our own reason for our action, usually because the offered reason will sound better to the audience than our actual reason."[4]
AYN RAND'S VIEW. Ayn Rand, who developed Objectivism, the philosophy that I have adopted, also classifies rationalization as a psychological phenomenon, "a process of providing one's emotions with a false identity, of giving them spurious explanations and justifications--in order to hide one's motives, not just from others, but primarily from oneself."[5] "Rationalization is a process not of perceiving reality, but of attempting to make reality fit one's emotions." Further, Ayn Rand notes, as the term/idea applies to a person who is taking a particular philosophical position, rationalization means: "I can't prove it, but I feel that it's true."
WHAT RATIONALIZATION IS NOT. "Lying" is not synonymous with "rationalizing." Lying, which is consciously making false statements to gain or keep a value, is the general case. Rationalizing, if done consciously, is differentiated from other cases of lying by its purpose: making one's own actions appear to oneself or others to be morally acceptable. A con man may lie to his victim to get the victim's life savings, but the con man, in that instance, is defrauding not rationalizing. The con man might rationalize later in a courtroom by telling himself and the judge that we live in a rotten world and that scams are the only way to earn a living.
Nor is rationalization innocently providing a merely false explanation developed through an error in information or in method of handling the information. Rationalization, whether done consciously or subconsciously, is goal-directed not inadvertent. In this way, I would suggest, rationalizations are arbitrary not false. There is no connection to reality, not even a "broken" one that arises from error.
PROOF OF RATIONALIZATION? How can I know someone is rationalizing? In other words, what constitutes proof of this behavior? To even suspect that a person is rationalizing, I must know the person well (even if only through his writings, as with Kant) or I must have enough knowledge of the situation he is describing (that objects must conform to our a priori knowledge of them) to doubt his explanation (which conveniently serves to "make room for faith").
For example, in the case of Alex, named in the example at the beginning of this post, I would need to know him well enough to doubt that he would ever spend time going to a particular store merely to save money on one product--because I already know he is disorganized, uncaring about the future, and an impulse buyer who pays little attention to prices.
If I suspected rationalization, based on my knowledge of the person and the situation he is describing (in a way that makes his behavior seem credible and creditable), then I would need to inquire further, either by asking him questions (and observing his manner of handling them--such as evasiveness or incoherence) or by investigating the situation further (for example, by asking his friends if Alex has any connection to Kroeger's).
For the realm of philosophy, Ayn Rand offers two leads for uncovering rationalization. First: "When a theory achieves nothing but the opposite of its alleged goals, yet its advocates remain undeterred, you may be certain that it is not a conviction or an 'ideal', but a rationalization."
Second: When a person uses false philosophical catch phrases to excuse his reprehensible beliefs then he might be rationalizing. Ayn Rand identifies six common philsophical catch phrases rationalizers use: "Nobody can be certain of anything . . . It may be true for you , but it's not true for me . . . Nobody is perfect in this world . . . Nobody can help anything he does . . . It may have been true yesterday, but it's not true today . . . Logic has nothing to do with reality . . . ." These catch phrases provide a philosophical justification for taking an intellectual position that is not otherwise creditable or even credible.
CONCLUSIONS. Rationalizing is fake reasoning for the purpose of convincing oneself or others that one's actions are proper--done either consciously (in which case it is immoral) or as an automatic and hidden act of the subconscious (in which case it is a form of mental illness). The actions being justified may range from social behavior to taking a particular intellectual position. Even mere implausibility of an explanation can be grounds for suspicion, but proof of rationalization requires argumentation based on detailed evidence gained through inquiry. In most cases, fortunately, one need not prove another person is rationalizing; rather, the suspect carries the burden of proving his statements--if the situation is serious enough to demand proof.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
[1] For the matzo example: "Rationalization" in the "Fallacy" article of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [2] Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged. I am ignoring radically different uses of the term "rationalization" in mathematics, architecture, and economics. [3] From "Rationalization" and "Defenses (Defense Mechanisms)," AllPsychOnline. [4] "Rationalization," listed in the "Fallacy" article of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [5] This and subsequent references to or quotations from Ayn Rand come from: Ayn Rand, "Rationalization," The Ayn Rand Lexicon, citing Ayn Rand, "Philosophical Detection," Philosophy: Who Needs It, pp. 21 and 24(hb) or pp. 18 and 20 (pb).]
A mundane but classic example of rationalization, is: "'I bought the matzo bread from Kroger's Supermarket because it is the cheapest brand and I wanted to save money', says Alex (who knows he bought the bread from Kroger's . . . because his girlfriend works there [and he wanted to see her but without admitting his interest])."[1]
As an initial definition then rationalization refers to someone justifying what he is doing with an explanation that he knows--at some level in his mind--is not the true reason for his action, but one he made up to make his behavior appear to be more acceptable.
STANDARD USAGES OF THE TERM. Wherever possible, I prefer using terms/ideas as they are conventionally used--to make communication easier. My home dictionary offers this primary conventional usage of "rationalize": "1. to ascribe (one's acts, opinions, etc.) to causes that superficially seem reasonable and valid but . . . actually are unrelated to the true, possibly unconscious and often less creditable or agreeable causes."[2] This usage captures the fact (1) that a rationalization is a statement; (2) that the statement is false; and (3) that the statement is designed to make the speaker's behavior appear to be acceptable.
An online dictionary of psychology defines "rationalization" thus: "A defense mechanism where one believes or states an acceptable explanation for a behavior as opposed to the real explanation." And defense mechanisms are: "Psychological forces which prevent undesirable or inappropriate impulses from entering consciousness (e.g., forgetting responsibilities that we really didn't want to do, projecting anger onto a spouse as opposed to your boss)."[3]
An online philosophical dictionary describes the fallacy of rationalization thus: "We rationalize when we inauthentically offer reasons to support our claim. We are rationalizing when we give someone a reason to justify our action even though we know this reason is not really our own reason for our action, usually because the offered reason will sound better to the audience than our actual reason."[4]
AYN RAND'S VIEW. Ayn Rand, who developed Objectivism, the philosophy that I have adopted, also classifies rationalization as a psychological phenomenon, "a process of providing one's emotions with a false identity, of giving them spurious explanations and justifications--in order to hide one's motives, not just from others, but primarily from oneself."[5] "Rationalization is a process not of perceiving reality, but of attempting to make reality fit one's emotions." Further, Ayn Rand notes, as the term/idea applies to a person who is taking a particular philosophical position, rationalization means: "I can't prove it, but I feel that it's true."
WHAT RATIONALIZATION IS NOT. "Lying" is not synonymous with "rationalizing." Lying, which is consciously making false statements to gain or keep a value, is the general case. Rationalizing, if done consciously, is differentiated from other cases of lying by its purpose: making one's own actions appear to oneself or others to be morally acceptable. A con man may lie to his victim to get the victim's life savings, but the con man, in that instance, is defrauding not rationalizing. The con man might rationalize later in a courtroom by telling himself and the judge that we live in a rotten world and that scams are the only way to earn a living.
Nor is rationalization innocently providing a merely false explanation developed through an error in information or in method of handling the information. Rationalization, whether done consciously or subconsciously, is goal-directed not inadvertent. In this way, I would suggest, rationalizations are arbitrary not false. There is no connection to reality, not even a "broken" one that arises from error.
PROOF OF RATIONALIZATION? How can I know someone is rationalizing? In other words, what constitutes proof of this behavior? To even suspect that a person is rationalizing, I must know the person well (even if only through his writings, as with Kant) or I must have enough knowledge of the situation he is describing (that objects must conform to our a priori knowledge of them) to doubt his explanation (which conveniently serves to "make room for faith").
For example, in the case of Alex, named in the example at the beginning of this post, I would need to know him well enough to doubt that he would ever spend time going to a particular store merely to save money on one product--because I already know he is disorganized, uncaring about the future, and an impulse buyer who pays little attention to prices.
If I suspected rationalization, based on my knowledge of the person and the situation he is describing (in a way that makes his behavior seem credible and creditable), then I would need to inquire further, either by asking him questions (and observing his manner of handling them--such as evasiveness or incoherence) or by investigating the situation further (for example, by asking his friends if Alex has any connection to Kroeger's).
For the realm of philosophy, Ayn Rand offers two leads for uncovering rationalization. First: "When a theory achieves nothing but the opposite of its alleged goals, yet its advocates remain undeterred, you may be certain that it is not a conviction or an 'ideal', but a rationalization."
Second: When a person uses false philosophical catch phrases to excuse his reprehensible beliefs then he might be rationalizing. Ayn Rand identifies six common philsophical catch phrases rationalizers use: "Nobody can be certain of anything . . . It may be true for you , but it's not true for me . . . Nobody is perfect in this world . . . Nobody can help anything he does . . . It may have been true yesterday, but it's not true today . . . Logic has nothing to do with reality . . . ." These catch phrases provide a philosophical justification for taking an intellectual position that is not otherwise creditable or even credible.
CONCLUSIONS. Rationalizing is fake reasoning for the purpose of convincing oneself or others that one's actions are proper--done either consciously (in which case it is immoral) or as an automatic and hidden act of the subconscious (in which case it is a form of mental illness). The actions being justified may range from social behavior to taking a particular intellectual position. Even mere implausibility of an explanation can be grounds for suspicion, but proof of rationalization requires argumentation based on detailed evidence gained through inquiry. In most cases, fortunately, one need not prove another person is rationalizing; rather, the suspect carries the burden of proving his statements--if the situation is serious enough to demand proof.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
[1] For the matzo example: "Rationalization" in the "Fallacy" article of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [2] Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged. I am ignoring radically different uses of the term "rationalization" in mathematics, architecture, and economics. [3] From "Rationalization" and "Defenses (Defense Mechanisms)," AllPsychOnline. [4] "Rationalization," listed in the "Fallacy" article of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [5] This and subsequent references to or quotations from Ayn Rand come from: Ayn Rand, "Rationalization," The Ayn Rand Lexicon, citing Ayn Rand, "Philosophical Detection," Philosophy: Who Needs It, pp. 21 and 24(hb) or pp. 18 and 20 (pb).]
Nov 9, 2008
Asymmetrical Debate?
[This question arose on Study Groups for Objectivists in discussions of Yaron Brook's and Onkar Ghate's insightful "Cultural Movements: Creating Change" lectures (available on the website of the Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights, under the headings Participate/Activism).]
Here is a problem for students of the history of ideas, intellectual history, or cultural history: Reason is difficult and rare, but mysticism--in all its many forms--is easy and common. How can reason ever win?
Reason is difficult because it requires effort to be aware, to define a problem, to select a method, to persist in seeking information, to check the results for contradictions with already-held knowledge, and so forth. Mysticism is easy. If it is subjectivist, ideas are whatever the mystic wants them to be, regardless of facts. If it is intrinsicist, ideas simply arrive, either from the subconscious as intuition or from God as revelation.
In debate between advocates of reason and mystics, those who support reason do research, think about their results, formulate answers to essential questions, consider the nature of their audience, and so forth. Mystics need only blurt out whatever they feel.
Consider a contemporary example. In general, the conservative and leftist enemies of a culture of reason are mystics of one sort or another. They do not offer reasoned arguments. If I say I am pro-choice on abortion, a conservative may show me a picture of a dead fetus. A picture is not an argument, that is, not a reasoned process leading from facts to conclusions. It is an appeal to emotion. If I am to win the debate (held before a worthy audience) then I may need to go through a step-by-step argument identifying the problem underlying my opponent's last statement and offering a solution. My conservative opponent, if typical, next responds by screaming that I am a baby-killer. This is mysticism vs. reasoning--in debate.
(Intellectually, no debate is possible between mystics and advocates of reason, but socially such debates occur frequently before audiences that are, one hopes, at least mixed: Some members of the audience are at least implicitly advocates of reason but may not yet agree with a particular pro-reason position on a particular issue.)
Consider another contemporary example. You try to explain a principle of economics--that state interference (aggression) in the home-finance marketplace has long-term destructive consequences--and why. Your opponent responds with a bizarre false-dichotomy based on unspoken hints of egalitarianism and altruism: "But we are just using this bailout as a way of protecting Main Street against Wall Street!" You then must (1) determine what he is talking about in reality, if anything; (2) prepare your conclusions in terms and in a form that a rational but ill-informed audience listening to the debate would understand; and (3) offer an objective alternative based on principles you want to disseminate.
At first sight, the odds seem stacked against advocates of reason ever winning in their struggles with mystics. Yet, advocates of reason have won issue after issue, in some places and in some times. How can that be true when the odds against them seem so high?
I do not have a fully integrated answer to this problem yet, but I can suggest elements. First is the fact that in some societies there have been enough decision-makers and decision-influencers who were rational enough (in most areas of their lives) that advocates of reason and its products had a chance to win enough support, or even merely acquiescence, to at least make progress. Galileo lived in Italy. His ideas were censored there, but he managed to smuggle his writings out to lands where they met an eager audience. Perhaps the political fragmentation of Europe--from the Greeks up to the European Union--usually provided a refuge somewhere for advocates of reason.
Second is the fact--at least in Western culture--that rational people creating rational products have always had an effect far beyond their public numbers. Think again of Galileo. On the short-term he lost in his struggle with the Church in Italy in the mid-1600s. But his ideas ultimately did win wide acceptance among intellectuals. His ideas were presumably persuasive to dozens, then hundreds, then thousands of often nameless individuals in the following decades. In this manner, Galileo's ideas won. The people advocates of reason need to reach are not only the tiny number of Galileos and their peers, but also the thousands (out of millions) of rational individuals who will integrate and propagate, if not originate, rational ideas. An advocate of reason does not need to reach everyone or even a majority.
Only a few people set the direction of a culture. If advocates of reason can persuade, or even just neutralize, half of those people, then the advocates of reason can start making cultural changes within one generation. I have seen this process of changing the views of the powerful minority happen in business. On a committee of twelve people, two to four people either directly make the decisions or influence decision-making. Most of the others on the committee swivel their heads back and forth as each debater in turn presents his case pro or con.
In summary, I do see that reasoned presentations can indeed win support from rational members of one's audience, even in a "debate" against a mystic--but only in a culture already accepting a philosophy of reason to some extent; and only over the long term, which is the time required to analyze problems, develop solutions, figure out the best way to present the solutions, and actually make one's case to the intended audience (narrow or broad).
As a long-term student of history, I would love to have the time to investigate at least one case of such a victory: Galileo's ideas on astronomy, Darwin's ideas on evolution, Locke's ideas on politics, the idea of freedom of speech, or others.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Here is a problem for students of the history of ideas, intellectual history, or cultural history: Reason is difficult and rare, but mysticism--in all its many forms--is easy and common. How can reason ever win?
Reason is difficult because it requires effort to be aware, to define a problem, to select a method, to persist in seeking information, to check the results for contradictions with already-held knowledge, and so forth. Mysticism is easy. If it is subjectivist, ideas are whatever the mystic wants them to be, regardless of facts. If it is intrinsicist, ideas simply arrive, either from the subconscious as intuition or from God as revelation.
In debate between advocates of reason and mystics, those who support reason do research, think about their results, formulate answers to essential questions, consider the nature of their audience, and so forth. Mystics need only blurt out whatever they feel.
Consider a contemporary example. In general, the conservative and leftist enemies of a culture of reason are mystics of one sort or another. They do not offer reasoned arguments. If I say I am pro-choice on abortion, a conservative may show me a picture of a dead fetus. A picture is not an argument, that is, not a reasoned process leading from facts to conclusions. It is an appeal to emotion. If I am to win the debate (held before a worthy audience) then I may need to go through a step-by-step argument identifying the problem underlying my opponent's last statement and offering a solution. My conservative opponent, if typical, next responds by screaming that I am a baby-killer. This is mysticism vs. reasoning--in debate.
(Intellectually, no debate is possible between mystics and advocates of reason, but socially such debates occur frequently before audiences that are, one hopes, at least mixed: Some members of the audience are at least implicitly advocates of reason but may not yet agree with a particular pro-reason position on a particular issue.)
Consider another contemporary example. You try to explain a principle of economics--that state interference (aggression) in the home-finance marketplace has long-term destructive consequences--and why. Your opponent responds with a bizarre false-dichotomy based on unspoken hints of egalitarianism and altruism: "But we are just using this bailout as a way of protecting Main Street against Wall Street!" You then must (1) determine what he is talking about in reality, if anything; (2) prepare your conclusions in terms and in a form that a rational but ill-informed audience listening to the debate would understand; and (3) offer an objective alternative based on principles you want to disseminate.
At first sight, the odds seem stacked against advocates of reason ever winning in their struggles with mystics. Yet, advocates of reason have won issue after issue, in some places and in some times. How can that be true when the odds against them seem so high?
I do not have a fully integrated answer to this problem yet, but I can suggest elements. First is the fact that in some societies there have been enough decision-makers and decision-influencers who were rational enough (in most areas of their lives) that advocates of reason and its products had a chance to win enough support, or even merely acquiescence, to at least make progress. Galileo lived in Italy. His ideas were censored there, but he managed to smuggle his writings out to lands where they met an eager audience. Perhaps the political fragmentation of Europe--from the Greeks up to the European Union--usually provided a refuge somewhere for advocates of reason.
Second is the fact--at least in Western culture--that rational people creating rational products have always had an effect far beyond their public numbers. Think again of Galileo. On the short-term he lost in his struggle with the Church in Italy in the mid-1600s. But his ideas ultimately did win wide acceptance among intellectuals. His ideas were presumably persuasive to dozens, then hundreds, then thousands of often nameless individuals in the following decades. In this manner, Galileo's ideas won. The people advocates of reason need to reach are not only the tiny number of Galileos and their peers, but also the thousands (out of millions) of rational individuals who will integrate and propagate, if not originate, rational ideas. An advocate of reason does not need to reach everyone or even a majority.
Only a few people set the direction of a culture. If advocates of reason can persuade, or even just neutralize, half of those people, then the advocates of reason can start making cultural changes within one generation. I have seen this process of changing the views of the powerful minority happen in business. On a committee of twelve people, two to four people either directly make the decisions or influence decision-making. Most of the others on the committee swivel their heads back and forth as each debater in turn presents his case pro or con.
In summary, I do see that reasoned presentations can indeed win support from rational members of one's audience, even in a "debate" against a mystic--but only in a culture already accepting a philosophy of reason to some extent; and only over the long term, which is the time required to analyze problems, develop solutions, figure out the best way to present the solutions, and actually make one's case to the intended audience (narrow or broad).
As a long-term student of history, I would love to have the time to investigate at least one case of such a victory: Galileo's ideas on astronomy, Darwin's ideas on evolution, Locke's ideas on politics, the idea of freedom of speech, or others.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Oct 24, 2008
Predicting the timing of cultural changes?
Study Groups for Objectivists (SGO) recently completed its five-week "Cultural Movements: Creating Change" study group. The "text" was the series of three lectures, by the same title, which Drs. Onkar Ghate and Yaron Brook presented at Objectivist Conferences 2008, now available for viewing on The Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights website under PARTICIPATE/Activism (or Search).
Lecture 3 drew conclusions from the historical reviews in Lectures 1 and 2. Around 0700-0900 of Part 1 of Lecture 3, Brook said (in my paraphrase): No one knows with confidence how much time we have left before present trends become irreversible. Some observers of today's culture say that, if present destructive cultural trends continue unopposed, the period of decline in the USA (before economic and cultural collapse) will be about 40 years. However, I, Onkar, and others estimate we may have only about 20 years to turn the culture around before the trends become irreversible.
Brook's and Ghate's comments here, and throughout their lectures, are stimulating. One question that emerges for me is a question of methods: How can one predict the timing of changes in society and culture? That question, in turn, leads me to another question: Why can specialists who study aspects of society or culture--as economists do--predict that certain results will follow from certain other events, but cannot predict when the results will appear and how much effect the cause will have?
I remember that in 1971 Republican President Richard Nixon, imposed price controls on the United States. Free-market economists predicted that shortages would result. They disagreed about when the shortages would appear and how severe the effects would be.
The only lead to an answer to my question that I can offer is that scientists, like philosophers, make assumptions about conditions. One example might be in physics, a field in which laboratory experiments control background conditions (such as humidity and air pressure) that might affect the outcome of an experiment, while looking at the effects of one changing variable, such as temperature. In the sciences where physical experiments are not possible, the scientist (for example, an economist) assumes "all other factors being equal." He conducts a sort of "thought experiment," separating out irrelevant variables for the particular prediction he is making.
By contrast, predicting the future course of a society or culture as a whole requires the inclusion of those "other factors." There are so many "other factors," most of which depend on many individuals choosing or not choosing to take certain intermediate actions, that predicting the quantifiable results becomes a matter of "guesstimating" or making a "professional judgment" by someone who has long experience in the field and has immersed himself in the details of a particular problem.
In the absence of a clearly defined method developed by a philosophical genius, making "professional judgments" is probably the best anyone can do. Are there better solutions?
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Lecture 3 drew conclusions from the historical reviews in Lectures 1 and 2. Around 0700-0900 of Part 1 of Lecture 3, Brook said (in my paraphrase): No one knows with confidence how much time we have left before present trends become irreversible. Some observers of today's culture say that, if present destructive cultural trends continue unopposed, the period of decline in the USA (before economic and cultural collapse) will be about 40 years. However, I, Onkar, and others estimate we may have only about 20 years to turn the culture around before the trends become irreversible.
Brook's and Ghate's comments here, and throughout their lectures, are stimulating. One question that emerges for me is a question of methods: How can one predict the timing of changes in society and culture? That question, in turn, leads me to another question: Why can specialists who study aspects of society or culture--as economists do--predict that certain results will follow from certain other events, but cannot predict when the results will appear and how much effect the cause will have?
I remember that in 1971 Republican President Richard Nixon, imposed price controls on the United States. Free-market economists predicted that shortages would result. They disagreed about when the shortages would appear and how severe the effects would be.
The only lead to an answer to my question that I can offer is that scientists, like philosophers, make assumptions about conditions. One example might be in physics, a field in which laboratory experiments control background conditions (such as humidity and air pressure) that might affect the outcome of an experiment, while looking at the effects of one changing variable, such as temperature. In the sciences where physical experiments are not possible, the scientist (for example, an economist) assumes "all other factors being equal." He conducts a sort of "thought experiment," separating out irrelevant variables for the particular prediction he is making.
By contrast, predicting the future course of a society or culture as a whole requires the inclusion of those "other factors." There are so many "other factors," most of which depend on many individuals choosing or not choosing to take certain intermediate actions, that predicting the quantifiable results becomes a matter of "guesstimating" or making a "professional judgment" by someone who has long experience in the field and has immersed himself in the details of a particular problem.
In the absence of a clearly defined method developed by a philosophical genius, making "professional judgments" is probably the best anyone can do. Are there better solutions?
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Sep 29, 2008
What can historians study?
As a long-term student of history, I am fascinated with the many ways one can approach the subject. By "history" here I mean the total of all human events of the past. We can know those events through the historical record: blood-stained flint arrowheads; paintings on cave walls; relief sculpture on marble monuments; "holy scripture" on vellum; the weave of clothing on bodies buried in peat bogs; handwritten philosophical journals; and governmental records stored on sun-baked clay tablets, sheets of papyrus, or computer hard drives. History, as a field of productive work, is an inquiry (historia, in ancient Greek) into events of the past.
WHOLES. First of all, historians can draw inferences from these items to describe whole periods of history: the Roman Empire (27 BCE-c. 400 AD), the Gupta Empire of northern India (c. 320-550), the explosive expansion of Islam (c. 600-800), the Ming Dynasty in eastern China (1368-1644), the Renaissance (c. 1400-1550), and the spread of communism in the 20th Century.
INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS. Each type of evidence used by some historians to describe broad periods of the past can itself become an object of long-term study by other historians. For example, one can study the history of stone tools, as a section of the history of technology, itself a division of the history of culture, that is, all the products created by some individuals and passed to other individuals in their own society or in later generations.
Other elements of culture suitable for historical study include languages, customs, institutions, and ideas. In the latter domain, one may study individual ideas--such as the idea of progress, the idea of reform, or the idea of a particular metaphysical hierarchy; or one may study ideas as systems, as in the study of the history of a particular worldview (religion or philosophy). In one way, studying the history of a particular religion, such as Christianity, is narrow because it excludes many other religions; but in another way, in the number of objects subsumed, studying the history of a particular religion is an enormous task: from the past flows a river of ideas, customs, institutions, and the lives of millions of individuals, each with his own particular understanding of the religion.
Time is another dimension that partly defines a historian's object of study. One historian might study a particular subject either at one point in time (the culture of the Americas in 1491) or through a great length of time (the Church in the Middle Ages). Another historian might specialize in generalizations, so to speak. For instance, a historian who is fascinated with societies considered as wholes might compare cultures such as the Indus River Valley culture of c. 2000 BCE and the culture of the Mayans c. 500 CE.
Still other historians can work in the area that underlies history as a field of inquiry: the philosophy of history. These historians would address questions such as: What is history? What are the proper objects of study? What special cognitive problems arise in studying aspects of reality that no longer exist and can be known only by fragments from the past? What ethical problems, if any, arise for historians, knowing that their conclusions may influence views of the past and therefore affect not only contemporary politics but also the inferences of philosophers?
At the other end of the scale of abstractions, some historians, those fascinated with the manner in which particular individuals acted in the circumstances of their time, might turn to writing biographies. Or historians who are fascinated with examining history under a microscope might turn to a particular event (the Islamofascist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001), a particular institution (socialized medicine in Britain), or a particular movement (the movement to abolish slavery in the 19th Century). At this scale of work, the historian can observe particular individuals taking particular actions which had particular observable effects. Carrying this approach further, some historians might study an event while it is happening--as in the seemingly endless NATO "war" in Afghanistan against "terrorists."
In summary, a particular historian may choose for study any element of human action or culture at any particular time or place. His object of study may be ancient or contemporary, small- or large-scale, concrete or abstract, and particular or general in scope. The historian is limited only by his own purpose, the length of his productive life--and the facts of what individuals have actually done, as shown in the historical record.
EXAMPLES. Following are examples of historical studies from my library. (I am not making recommendations, only citing examples.) Together they illustrate the vast range of objects which historians can study.
- The Story of Maps, Lloyd A. Brown: a history of maps from the ancient world to c. 1950.
- The Great Chain of Being, Arthur O. Lovejoy: a history of an invalid but enormously influential idea, a metaphysical hierarchy ranging from God down to the lowest worm.
- The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350, Robert Bartlett: a detailed examination of the extraordinary wellspring of Viking-French "nobles" spreading from their homeland in Normandy to the periphery of Europe, from England (in 1066) to Constantinople.
- Holy Entrepreneurs: Cistercians, Knights, and Economic Exchange in Twelfth-Century Burgundy, Constance Brittain Bouchard: a report about the dynamic this-worldly economic activities of Cistercian monasteries (which were officially devoted to poverty and separation from this world), based on the author's detailed study of monastic records surviving for 800 years.
-Clocks and Culture: 1300-1700, Carlo M. Cipolla: a study that is both narrow (looking at one mechanical invention, the clock) and broad (what the radical differences in design and use of clocks in Ming Dynasty China and Renaissance Europe reveal about the two cultures during the "period of the great divergence" of Eastern and Western culture).
-That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession, Peter Novick: a study of the struggles over the issue of objectivity--myth or norm?--in the profession of history in the USA from c. 1880-1980.
-Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial, Richard J. Evans: a close look--written as an intellectual detective story--at Evans's own research into the Holocaust and at his objective testimony in a British civil trial, a trial in which Nazi-sympathizer David Irving sued an American writer for libel because she said Irving's historical writings were fraudulent (which they were).
To a beginning student of history who is wondering what to study, my suggestion is to follow your passionate interests, held within the context of your highest values, including your central purpose in life. Are you fascinated with the history of Pittsburgh, the evolution of stone tools, or the development of logic? Follow your love.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
WHOLES. First of all, historians can draw inferences from these items to describe whole periods of history: the Roman Empire (27 BCE-c. 400 AD), the Gupta Empire of northern India (c. 320-550), the explosive expansion of Islam (c. 600-800), the Ming Dynasty in eastern China (1368-1644), the Renaissance (c. 1400-1550), and the spread of communism in the 20th Century.
INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS. Each type of evidence used by some historians to describe broad periods of the past can itself become an object of long-term study by other historians. For example, one can study the history of stone tools, as a section of the history of technology, itself a division of the history of culture, that is, all the products created by some individuals and passed to other individuals in their own society or in later generations.
Other elements of culture suitable for historical study include languages, customs, institutions, and ideas. In the latter domain, one may study individual ideas--such as the idea of progress, the idea of reform, or the idea of a particular metaphysical hierarchy; or one may study ideas as systems, as in the study of the history of a particular worldview (religion or philosophy). In one way, studying the history of a particular religion, such as Christianity, is narrow because it excludes many other religions; but in another way, in the number of objects subsumed, studying the history of a particular religion is an enormous task: from the past flows a river of ideas, customs, institutions, and the lives of millions of individuals, each with his own particular understanding of the religion.
Time is another dimension that partly defines a historian's object of study. One historian might study a particular subject either at one point in time (the culture of the Americas in 1491) or through a great length of time (the Church in the Middle Ages). Another historian might specialize in generalizations, so to speak. For instance, a historian who is fascinated with societies considered as wholes might compare cultures such as the Indus River Valley culture of c. 2000 BCE and the culture of the Mayans c. 500 CE.
Still other historians can work in the area that underlies history as a field of inquiry: the philosophy of history. These historians would address questions such as: What is history? What are the proper objects of study? What special cognitive problems arise in studying aspects of reality that no longer exist and can be known only by fragments from the past? What ethical problems, if any, arise for historians, knowing that their conclusions may influence views of the past and therefore affect not only contemporary politics but also the inferences of philosophers?
At the other end of the scale of abstractions, some historians, those fascinated with the manner in which particular individuals acted in the circumstances of their time, might turn to writing biographies. Or historians who are fascinated with examining history under a microscope might turn to a particular event (the Islamofascist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001), a particular institution (socialized medicine in Britain), or a particular movement (the movement to abolish slavery in the 19th Century). At this scale of work, the historian can observe particular individuals taking particular actions which had particular observable effects. Carrying this approach further, some historians might study an event while it is happening--as in the seemingly endless NATO "war" in Afghanistan against "terrorists."
In summary, a particular historian may choose for study any element of human action or culture at any particular time or place. His object of study may be ancient or contemporary, small- or large-scale, concrete or abstract, and particular or general in scope. The historian is limited only by his own purpose, the length of his productive life--and the facts of what individuals have actually done, as shown in the historical record.
EXAMPLES. Following are examples of historical studies from my library. (I am not making recommendations, only citing examples.) Together they illustrate the vast range of objects which historians can study.
- The Story of Maps, Lloyd A. Brown: a history of maps from the ancient world to c. 1950.
- The Great Chain of Being, Arthur O. Lovejoy: a history of an invalid but enormously influential idea, a metaphysical hierarchy ranging from God down to the lowest worm.
- The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350, Robert Bartlett: a detailed examination of the extraordinary wellspring of Viking-French "nobles" spreading from their homeland in Normandy to the periphery of Europe, from England (in 1066) to Constantinople.
- Holy Entrepreneurs: Cistercians, Knights, and Economic Exchange in Twelfth-Century Burgundy, Constance Brittain Bouchard: a report about the dynamic this-worldly economic activities of Cistercian monasteries (which were officially devoted to poverty and separation from this world), based on the author's detailed study of monastic records surviving for 800 years.
-Clocks and Culture: 1300-1700, Carlo M. Cipolla: a study that is both narrow (looking at one mechanical invention, the clock) and broad (what the radical differences in design and use of clocks in Ming Dynasty China and Renaissance Europe reveal about the two cultures during the "period of the great divergence" of Eastern and Western culture).
-That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession, Peter Novick: a study of the struggles over the issue of objectivity--myth or norm?--in the profession of history in the USA from c. 1880-1980.
-Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial, Richard J. Evans: a close look--written as an intellectual detective story--at Evans's own research into the Holocaust and at his objective testimony in a British civil trial, a trial in which Nazi-sympathizer David Irving sued an American writer for libel because she said Irving's historical writings were fraudulent (which they were).
To a beginning student of history who is wondering what to study, my suggestion is to follow your passionate interests, held within the context of your highest values, including your central purpose in life. Are you fascinated with the history of Pittsburgh, the evolution of stone tools, or the development of logic? Follow your love.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Aug 31, 2008
A Study Group for Intellectual Activists
Would you like to improve the world in which you live? The four-week "Cultural Movements: Creating Change" study group (CMCCSG) might be the right place for you to start. Within a few weeks, the CMCCSG will begin in SGO at: http://www.studygroupsforobjectivists.com/
Every SGO study group is focused on a particular text, but as an experiment the "text" here consists of videos of the three lectures Yaron Brook and Onkar Ghate presented at the 2008 Objectivist Conference (OCON).
The CMCC lectures examine three 20th Century movements that were at least partly successful: free-market economics, environmentalism, and religious fundamentalism. (For the nature of a "movement," see the July 5 and July 14, 2008 posts.) The two speakers then draw from what they learned about those movements to suggest techniques for the Objectivist movement.
CMCCSG is a very short-term study group for anyone who wants to improve our world in the decades ahead. For long-term students of history, an added benefit of studying these lectures is seeing the value of applying lessons from history.
To join this study group, (1) register as a member of SGO, and (2) click on the home page link ("All") for the "Cultural Movements: Creating Change" study group. That link will take you to the "Details" page, which describes the study group and allows you to participate.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
Every SGO study group is focused on a particular text, but as an experiment the "text" here consists of videos of the three lectures Yaron Brook and Onkar Ghate presented at the 2008 Objectivist Conference (OCON).
The CMCC lectures examine three 20th Century movements that were at least partly successful: free-market economics, environmentalism, and religious fundamentalism. (For the nature of a "movement," see the July 5 and July 14, 2008 posts.) The two speakers then draw from what they learned about those movements to suggest techniques for the Objectivist movement.
CMCCSG is a very short-term study group for anyone who wants to improve our world in the decades ahead. For long-term students of history, an added benefit of studying these lectures is seeing the value of applying lessons from history.
To join this study group, (1) register as a member of SGO, and (2) click on the home page link ("All") for the "Cultural Movements: Creating Change" study group. That link will take you to the "Details" page, which describes the study group and allows you to participate.
Burgess Laughlin
Author, The Power and the Glory: The Key Ideas and Crusading Lives of Eight Debaters of Reason vs. Faith
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